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THE DETERMINANTS AND ECONOMIC OUTCOMES OF
TRUST IN SUPPLIER-BUYER RELATIONS
ABSTRACT
In this paper we examine the antecedents and outcomes of supplier trust in 453 supplier-automaker
relationships in the U.S., Jap~ and Korea. Our findings indicate that high supplier trust emerges
when (1) automakers have developed assistance-giving routines to help suppliers improve, and (2)
automakers maintaina continuing (repeated) exchange relationship with the supplier. We also found
that trust reduces transaction costs and increases information sharing in supplier-buyerrelationships.
Moreover, the findings suggest that the economic value created for tmnsactors may be substantial
as evidenced by the fact that the automaker with the least trusting supplier relations had five times
the procurement costs and spent tice as much of its fiice-to-faceinteraction time with suppliers on
ex ante contracting and ex post haggling when compared to the most trusted automakers. Thus, our
findings suggest that trust in supplier-buyer relations can create economic value and may be an
important source of competitive advantage.

The issue of trust in economic exchanges has recently received considerable atiention in
the academic literature (Sake, 1991; Williamson, 1993; Barney & Hansen, 1994; Mayer, et al
1995) as well as the popular press (Business Week, 1986, 1992; Economist, 1995; Fukuyam~
1995). Some have described trust in exchange relationships as an important antecedent to
effective irzterorgani=tional collaboration (Jarillo, 1990; Sake, 1991; Smith, Carroll, and
AsMor~ 1995), and have proposed that it is a valuable economic asset. Furthermore, some have
proposed thattrustin supplier-buyer relations: (1) lowers transaction costs and allows for greater
flexibility in responding to changing market conditions (Dore, 1983; Sa.ko, 1991; Barney&
HanseIL 1994; Dyer, 1996b), (2) leads to superior information sharing routines, which improve
both coordination and mutual tom inimize inefficiencies (Aoki, 1988; Clark& Fujimoto, 1991;
Nishiguchi, 1994), and (3) facilitates investments in transaction or relation-specljic assetsi and
technologies which enhance productivity (Asan~ 1989; Lore= 1988; Dyer, 1996a). Some
scholars even claim that mtional economic efficiency is highly correlated with the existence of a
high trust institutional environment (Nortk 1990; Casson, 1991; Hill, 1995; Fukuyamz 1995).
For example, Fukuyama (1995:7) argues that the economic success of a natiom “as well as its
ability to compete, is conditioned by . . . the level of trust inherent in the socie~.” Ind@
numerous scholars have suggested that interorganizational trust is a key factor in explaining the
competitive advantage of Japanese firms relative to U.S. or U.IC ilrrns (Dore, 1983; Smi@
1991; Sake, 1991; Dyer, 1996b). The findings from these, and other, studies have increased our
attention on the important role of trust in economic exchanges.
‘ We use the terms transaction and relation-specific investments interchangeably,though we prefer the
term “relation-specific” to suggest a shifl in attention horn the transaction to the economic relationship as
the unit of analysis (see KoguL 198$%Powell, 1990).
[n response to these studies, some have exhorted companies to build trust with their
trading partners (Business Week, 1986, 1992) and called for increased research on the role of
trust in coordinating economic activity (Smith, CarrO1l,and Ashford, 1995). However, despite
considerable academic and managerial interest in trust between trading partners, to date there has
been little empirical research on the antecedents or economic outcomes of interorganizational
trust (i.e. bemeen suppliers and buyers). In fact, with the exception of some anecdotal, case
study evidence (Dore, 1983; Lorew 1988; Sake, 1991; Fukuyam% 1995; Dyer, 1996b) there
have been few, if any, large-sample empirical studies on the relationship between trust and the
various activities believed to create economic value in exchange relationships. As Zucker
(1986:59) has obsewe~ “For a concept that is acknowledged as central, trust has received very
littie empirical investigation-”
In this paper we examine the dete rxninants of trust as well as the relationship between
trust and performance outcomes, in a sample of supplier-buyer exchange relationships. More
specifically, we seek to answer the following questions:
(I) W%atvariables influence the doe!opment of & trust in supplier-buyer reiationrhips?
(2) Do_ that have developed a high level of trust in a buyer (a) incur lower transaction
costs, @ share more informatiofl and(c) make greater investments in relation-specific assets
than suppliers with iower levels of tit?
We investigate the antecedents and outcomes of trust in a sample of 453 supplier-automaker
exchange relationships in the U.S., JapaL and Korea We also examine the extent to which trust
creates “measuralie” economic value for automakers by examining whether or not “worthy”
automakers incur lower procurement (transaction) costs than “untrustworthy” automakers. In
summary, our objective is to empirically examine in a cross-national setting: (1) the determhmts
of supplier trusk and (2) whether or not trust creates economic value in supplier-buyerrelatiomtips.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES
Defining Trust
Williamson (1993 :453) has noted that “trust is a term with many meanings.” Indeed, various
scholars have offered different definitions of types of trust, including goodwill or relational trust
(Sake, 1991; Sahel, 1993; Hesterley et al, 1995), process-based trust (Zucker, 1986; Zaheer &
VenkatramU 1995), institutional trust (AITOW,1974; Zucker, 1986), competence trust (Sake, 1991),
and calculative or contractual trust (Sake, 1991; Williamson, 1993). Among organizational scholars,
trust has received attention as a mechanism of organizational control, especially as an alternative to
price, contracts, and authority (Ouchi, 1980; Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Powell, 1990). In this study
we consider trust between a supplier and its customer. We define trust as one party’s confidence that
the other party in the exchange relationship will not exploit its vuinerabilities (Dore, 1983; Sake,
1991; Sahel, 1993; Barney & HansexL 1994). This confidence (trust) is expected to emerge in
situations where the “trustworthy” p- in the exchange relationship: (1) makes good ftith efforts
to behave in accordance with prior commitments, (2) treats the exchange partner in ways perceived
as “fair” by that partner, and (3) does not take advantage of an exchange partner even when the
opportunity is available. In many respects, opportunism may be viewed as the opposite of trust. A
firm is opportunisdcto the extent that it does not live up to prior commitments and takes advantage
of an exchange partner’s vulnerabilities. Our definition of trust is similar to the “goodwill trust”
description given by Sako (1991) and the “trust” definitions offered by numerous schohrs (Sahel,
1993; Ring &Van de Ve~ 1992; Barney& HanseQ 1994). As defied here, trust is self’tiorcing
and is not based upon contractdegal sanctions.
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—The Determinants of Trust
A firm may trust trading partners to refuse to break confidences and exploit vulnerabilities
for a variety of reasons. However, typically we would expect trading partners to behave in a
trustworthy manner because ftilure to do so would result in social sanctions (Sahhns, 1972; Dore,
1983; Grannovetter, 1985; Powell, 1990) or economic sane/ions (IUei~ 1980; Williamson,
1983/1993).
Social Perspective
According to the sociological pempective, trust emerges through social interactions between
exchange partners (LighL 1972; Gmnnovet@, 1985; Powell, 1990). If a transaction is embedded
within a broader reciprocal social relationship, then transactors may rely on social sanctions to
protect their interests. Various types of social sanctions may control oppotism: withdrawal of
love, respeq prestige, and/or (worst of all) banishment horn the social community (Ligh~ 1972;
Smih 1983; Ellicksoq 1991). Thus, a firm that takes unfhiradvantageof a trading partner may fmd
any of a number of sanctions imposed by other members of the social network2 Furthermore, social
interactions may be usefid in ident@ingtrading partnem that embrace the value of being ethical or
who are “hardcore ~Orthy” due to intemahed val~ beliefs and norms (Mauss, 1967; Hill,
19W, Barney & _
Economic Perspwtive
1994).
Transactors may also behave in a trustworthy manner (refuse to be opportunistic) due to
“credible commitrnents”that they have made witha trading partner(Kle~ 1980; Williamson 1983).
2This assumes that exchange partners are part of the same social network.
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For example, ~ding partners may make financial or investment ~angements (stock swaps, equity
participation)that ~ purposefully designed to align their economic fortunes. These arrangements
are often referred to as credible commitments or an exchange of hostages.
In summary, the social perspective (Grannovetter, 1985; Dore, 1983; Powell, 1990) suggests
that trust will emerge due to social interactions between exchange partners. As the duration and
intensity of interactions between transactors increases, we would expect bonds of attraction to
develop and social sanctions to be more efllcacious. Our first wo hypotheses examine the effects
of length of relationship and intensity of relationship (as measured by face-to-face contact) on the
emergence of supplier trust. Thus, these hypotheses originate primarily horn a sociological
perspective. On the other han~ horn an economic perspective, we might expect trust to emerge
when the two parties incentives are effectively aligned and when credible commitments have been
made. Our hypothesis regarding stock ownership and trust is fimdarnentaily rooted in the
institutional economic perspective. The supplier trusts the buyer to treat the suppiier ftily because
the buyer’s incentives are properly aligned and there is an economic incentive to do so. Trustworthy
behavior is due primarily to economic rather than social considerations. Our hypothesis regarding
buyer assistance and tmst is derived primarily fi’omthis same literature-the act of giving assistance
to the supplier (making an economic investment) serves as a credible commitment Assistance-
giving behavior, however,also influences social interactionsand f=lingsof attraction. Finally, from
an economic perspdve, actions that create a repeated game serve to lengthen the “shadow of the
fimre” and result in more cooperative and trustworthy behavior. In economic parlance, agents are
signaling to each other that they are playing the cooperative equilibrium. However, playing a
repeated game also
increases socia.i interaction and enhances continuity
in an exchange relationship is influenced by both
in the social relationship. Thus, “continuity”
economic and social factors. We offer the
following rationales and hypotheses regarding the determinants of supplier trust.
Length of Relationship
Various scholars have suggested that trust is a valuable asset which takes time to develt-p ?md
can only be built slowly overtime (Arrow, 1974; Sake, 1991). Related to this view is the notion that
sociai knowledge, or knowledge gained through long term interactions, may be the basis for trust
by allowing economic actors to understand and predict others’ patterns of behavior (Tolbert, 1988;
Sok 1994). For example, Sohn (1994) found that in-depth social and cultural knowledge fzilitates
coordination of transactions by making a potential partners’ behavior both understandable and
predictable. Moreover,as social knowledge between transactors increases, inforrnationasymmetries
decrease, thereby reducing behavioral uncertainty. Higher levels of trust are believed to develop
when intlormationasymmetries are low (transactionconditionsapproxirnate perfect information) and
there is less behavioral uncatain~ (high predictability of behavior). Further, acquiring social
knowledge through long-term interactions provides insights into the “moral character” of trading
partners, thereby allowing tmnsactors to screen more accurately for “honest” partners (Hill, 1990;
Barney & Hanseu 1994).
Finally, wkn tmsactorsengage in long-term exchange relationships,they develop a history
together. The past history of interactions of tmnsactors is extremely important in developing social
ties. Most individuals are less likely to take advantage of those with whom they have had long and
stable past interactions (e.g., fdy memm friends, etc.) because these parties can impose real
social sanctions on the offending individual. Through long-term interaction a “sociai memory” is
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created and ~tors can achieve “serial equity” (equity/reciprocity over a longer period of time)
rather than requiring immediate or “spot equity” (Ouchi 1984). llms, we would expect higher levels
of tnxst to emerge in exchange relationsi~ips where the transactors have a long history of interacting.
Hypothesis 1: The longer the duration since the j?rst suppiier-buyer transaction, the higher the
supplier’s trust in the buyer.
Intensity of Relationship (Face-to-Face Communication)
Various studies have found that face-to-face interactions are likely to lead to the development
of positive feelings of attraction (Lorew 1988; Argyle, 1991). Further, cooperation and tmst
between individuals has been found to emerge in laboratory settings when individuals can see and
talk to each other and engage in social interaction (Argyle, 1991). Face-to-face communication has
been described as having a high knowledge-carrying capacity because it presents immediate
fdbackopportunitiesand makes use of both visual and audio channels of communication (Daft&
Lengel, 1986). Thus, it is considered usefid for developing trust because it offers more cues for
interpreting a trading partneis behavior and motivations. Moreover, face-to-face contact is viewed
as an effective means of developing personal ties, thereby increasing the eficacy of social sanctions.
From an economic pmpective, previous studies have suggested that fwe-to-face contact leads to
the development of interfkm cooperation and trust by increasing behavioral transparency and
reducing information asymmetry (Heide & Miner, 1992; Sake, 1991). Accordingly, we would
expect face--f= communication to increase supplier-buyer trust by: (1) fmilitating the
development personal ti~ thereby increasing the efficacy of social sanctions, and (2) providing
superior information to assist transactors in detecting trading partners that are the untru.mvorthy
“type.” Thus, we would expect that as the IYequency of face-to-face contact between transactors
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increases, so does interorganizational tmst. -
Hypothesis 2: me greater the face-to-face interaction bemeen the supplier and buyer, the higher
the level of supplier trust in the buyer.
Continuity of Relationship
In addition to length of relationship, continuity in the supplier-buyer relationship may
contribute to the development of interorganizationaltrust. It is possible for trading partners to have
had a long-term relationship(i.e. many years have passed since the initial transaction) even though
the relationship may not have been continuous. For example, some U.S. suppliers repofied that
although they began selling parts to a partictdarautomalcer 50 years ago, there have been occasions
when they have lost the component business to competitors. [n other instances, the supplier
continues to re-win the “contract” year after year. In this situatio~ contract renewal may serve as
a signal to the supplier that the automaker is playing a long-run “cooperative equilibrium.” Thus,
there is a high degree of continuity in the relationship and stability in the buyer’s supplier-selection
routines. Interfirm trust is built incrementally as firms interact repeatedly (Gulati, 1995).
The logic for how repeated games result in more cooperative behavior is well documented
in the game theory literature (hew 1984; Fudenberg and Mask@ 1986). We expect supplier
trust to emerge under conditions of repeated exchange due to buyer purchasing routines that are
predictable and consistent and which do not switch (perhaps opportunistically) business to
competitors (Butler, 1991; Heidi & Miner, 1992). Repeated exchange is particularly important to
the development of supplier trust in situations where suppliers have invested in relation-specific
assets. Under these conditio~ a buyeds willingness to stay with the same supplier is likely to be
interpreted by the supplier= a signal of commitment and trustworthiness. Thus, we expect supplier
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trust to be higher when the buyer has a history of continuous, repeated exchange with the suppiier.
Hypothesis 3: supplier trust is higher when the buyer has a track record of continuous repeated
exchange with the supplier.
Buyer Assistance
The importance of gift exchange in creating trust and reciprocity in exchange relationships
has long been argued by a distinguished line of anthropologists and sociologists (Maiinowski, 1932;
Mauss, 1967; Goukiner, 1963). Gouldner (1963) suggested that a norm of reciprocity begins with
a starting mechanism which may take the form of a gift or other acts of generosity or assistance.
More recently, Camerer (1988) has argued that even small, inefficient (with iittie practical value)
gifts often sewe as important and meaningful economic and social signals.
The rationale behind the trust-creating value of assistance/gifLgiving behavior is that an
exchange partner’s offer of %ee” assistance serves as a symbol of goodwill and benevolence
because it suggests that the giving party is genuinely concerned with the well being of the receiving
party. Also, the assistance may be viewed as a signal that the giving party does not have
opportunistic intent (is the honest “type”) and f=is benevolently towards the receiving party.
Benevolence is the pemeptionof a positive onentationof the trustee toward the trustor and has been
hypothesized to be positively associated with trust (Larzelere & Hustou 1980; Mayer et al, 1995).
When a buyer offkrs “free adstawe “to a supplier (i.e. if assistance is not iilly costed), the supplier
is likely to interpret such actions as a manifestation of commitment by the buyer, and may be a basis
for ‘goodwill trust’ (Sake, 1991).
Hypothesis 4: 7he greater the assistance provi&d by the buyer to the supplier, the greater the
suppliers trust in the buyer.
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Stock Ownership
KIein (1980) and Williamson (1983) suggest that one way to foster trust and prevent
opportunism is through the exchange of hostages. [n particular, Klein (1980:358) argues that
opportunism can be controlled by having the potential cheater put up a” forfeitable-at-will collateml
bond equal to the discounted value of the premium stream.” For example, in the case of a
franchising contract “the fknchisee maybe required to make an initial lump sum payment to the
hnchisor, thereby largely shiiling the potential threatened breach flom the franchisee (’free riding’
on a common trademark by supplying lower quaiity sewice) to the tichisor (terminating or
threatening to terminate the franchisee without cause and purchasing the franchisee investment at
a discounted price). The initial lump sum is equivalent to a collateral bond forfeitable at the will of
the &anchisof’ (Klein& Kenny, 1989:41). Other financial hostages, which diminish in value if a
transactors opportunistic, include stock swaps or equity participation in a trading partner (Pisano,
1989; Dyer & Ouchi, 1993; Bolton et al, 1994). We argue, as has Pisano (1989) and Bolten et al
(1994), that partial equity ownership constitutes a visible collateral bond that reduces opportunism
by aligning the incentives of each partner. The fact that the equity stake will decrease in value if a
party is opportunistic provides an incentive for trading partners to behave in a more trustworthy
fhshion. Shared equity may create conditions for informal trust to develop? Thus, we would expect
equity ownership to be positively associated with interorganizational trust.
3 Of course, it is also possible for stock ownershipto be inverselycorrelatedwith trust. To the extent that
stock ownership serves as a credible signal of long term commitme@ itmay promote goodwill tmsG
however, stock ownership may also be viewed as a substitute for goodwill trust. We assume a positive
relationship bemveenstock ownership and trust because in most cases in our sample, the buyer had owned
the supplier’sstock for at least 10years.
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Hypothesis 5: The greater the buyer’s ownership cfsuppiier stock the higher the [evel of slipplier
-t in the buyer.
Trust and Economic Performance
Trust is generally considered to be of most economic value when it is based on non-
contractual, rather than contractual mechanisms. The rationale for the economic value of l’non-
contractual” trust is straightionvard: trust eliminates the need for formal contracts, which are costly
to vmite, monitor, and etiorce (Hill, 1995; Barney & Hansen, 1994). Thus, trust is believed to
reduce transaction costs. Furthermore, some anecdotal evidence suggests that transactors are more
likely to share valuable work-related information when they have developed a high level of trust
(Lorew 1988; Sake, 1991; Nishiguchi, 1994). Finally, high levels of interorganizational trust may
prompt fms to make investments in productive relation-specific assets or technologies that are
tailored to the exchange relationship. We examine each of these proposed relationships in greater
detail.
Thst and Tramraction Costs
Transaction costs can be decomposed into four separate costs related to transacting: 1) search
costs, 2) contracting co- 3) monitoring costs, and 4) etiorcement costs (Williamson, 1985;
Henna@ 1993; NortlL 1990). Search costs inckk the costs of gathering information to identi~ and
evaluate potential trading partners. Contracting costs refer to the costs associated with negotiating
and witing an agreement Monitoring costs refm to the costs associated with monitoring the
agreement to ensure that each party fidfills the predetermined set of obligations. Enforcement costs
refer to the costs associated with ex post haggling and sanctioning a trading partner that does not
perform according to the predetermined agreemen~
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Trust may reduce the transaction costs incumed by exchange partners in three ways. First,
transactors will spend less time on ex ante contracting under conditions of high trust because they
believe that payoffs will be fairly divided. As a result, they do not have to plan for all fhture
contingencies because they are cotildent that equitable adjustments will be made as market
conditions change. Various scholars have obsewed that trust allows transactors to achieve “serial
equity” (equity/reciprocity over a longer period of time) rather than requiring immediate or “spot
equity” (Ouchi, 1984). Thus, it reduces the need for transactors to invest heavily in ex ante
bargaining.
Secon4 under conditions of high trus~ trading partners till spend less time and resources
on monitoring to see if the other party is shirking or Mfilling the “spirit” of the agreement. If each
exchange partner is cotildent that the other party will not take behave opportunisticallyeven if it has
the chance, then both parties can devote fewer resources to monitoring. Finally, trust may reduce
transaction costs by reducing the amount of time and resources that transactors spend on ex post
bargaining and haggling over problems that arise in the course of transacting. If trust is hi~ then
each party will assume that the other party is acting in good ftith and will interpret its behaviors
more positively (Uzzi, 1993). Consequently, exchange partners will spend less time haggling over
problems that have cmergedduring the course of transacting due to mutual confidence that inequities
will be ftily addmsad and remcdid
Hypothesis 6: I%e greater the supplier ~t in the buyer, the lower the transaction costs incurred
by the exchange partners.
Tiwst and Information Sharing
We theorize a positive relationship bemeen supplier trust and information sharing for two
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primary reaSOIIS.Fks~ if the supplier can ~t tiebuyer not to behave opportunistically, it will be
more willing to bring product design and process innovations to the buyer. However, a supplier will
voluntarily share this information only if it trusts the buyer not to steal its ideas and/or share them
with competitors (i.e. with in-house supplier divisions or other external supplier competitors). In
the absence of trust tiorrnation sharing on new ideas or technologies is unlikely because this
information could be “poached” or used opportunistically (Larson, 1992; Uzzi, 1993).
Secon~ a lack of trust may cause exchange partners to suppress potentially relevant
in.formationthat would be usefhl for problem solving. For example, suppliers may be unwilling to
share information on problems they are experiencing if they do not tmst the buyer to work
cooperatively in joint problem-solving. In particular, suppliers may be reluctant to share any
itionnation that exposes weaknesses and problems in their operations even though the sharing of
such information could result in valuable suggestions from the buyer that could lead to effective
solutions. In con- high trust may lead to the mechanisms associated with “voice” (i.e. direct
feedbaclGjoint problem solving) ~irshrnatL 1970; Helper, 1991; Nishiguchi, 1994) rather than exit
(termimtion of the relationship).
Hypothesis 7: 7%egreater the supplier trust in the buyer, the more the suppiier will share valuable
(con@htiai) work-rekzted information with the buyer.
Twt and Iwestwtents in Relanon+xc@c Assets
Recentstudies indicate that investments in relation-specific assets can enhance productivity
in exchange relationships (Asan~ 1989; Parkhe, 1993; Dyer, 1996a). However, investments in
relation-specific assets create appropriabie quasi rents, which in turn create the potential for
opportunism (Kleh et al., 1978). Thw in order for suppliers to willingly make investments in
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re]ation-specific =sets, they must have assurances-that the buyer WMnot behave opportunisticallyy
and attempt to appropriate these quasi-rents. This issue concerns many suppliers as demonstrated
by the empirical findings born recent studies (Lyons, 1994; Dyer, 1996b). For example, Lyens
(1994) found that 60 percent of U.K. transactors in a particular engineering field claimed that they
were not utilizing the optimal level of specialized investments with their main customer. Lyens
suggested that these suppliers did not make the optimal level of investments because they were
unwilling to expose themselves to the risk of being opportunistically exploited. In the absence of
u suppliers will be less likely to make investments in productivity-enhancing assets that are
tailored to a particular customer.
H~othesis 8: The greater the supplier trust in the buyer, the greater the suppiierk investment in
reiation-specijic assets.
Research Setting
The auto industry in the U.S., Jap~ and Korea was chosen as the research setting to examine
the antecedents and outcomes of trust in supplier-buyer relationships. This research setting was an
unusually good test site for Svo reasons. FirsG it was important to study a set of transaction
relationships in which trust might be important and valuable. For example, many researchers have
argued that risk or having something investe4 is requisite to trust l%e need for trust arises only
in a riskY situation (Deutsc4 1958; Mayer et 4 1995). me automobile iS a COmPleXProduct wi~
thousan& of components that must work together as a system. Components are often tailored to
specific models and as a result suppliers must make automaker-specific investments (NM@uchL
1994; Dyer, 1996a). Since these investments are not easily redeployable suppliers are at risk if
automakers choose to behave opportunistically. Furthermore, the auto industry is characterized by
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a high degree of market uncertainty (Pine, 1993), which aiso increases the risks associated with
transacting as we!l as the importance of Monnation sharing (Lorem 1988; Aoki, 1988). Supplier
trust is of particular importance since suppliers make customer-specific investments that place them
at risk and give automakers a position of stronger relative bargaining power.
Secon& the automotive industry is a large and important industry in the U.S., Japan, and
Korea. Studying supplier-buyer relationships in the same industry across different institutional
environments allows for some control
impact of the institutional environment.
in different institutional environments
of extraneous variation, thereby allowing a focus on the
Moreover, studying the antecedents and outcomes of trust
is valuable because numerous scholars have argued that
national culture can influence trust and cooperation (Hill, 1995; Fukuyam~ 1995). By studying
supplier-buyerrelationships in three countries, we can examine whether or not the antecedents and
outcomes of trust differ in the different institutional environments.
Samp[e and Data Collection
The sample consisted of three U.S. (General Motors, For& Chrysler), two Japanese (Toyo@
Nissan), and three Korean (Hyundai, Daewoo, Kia) automakers and a sample of their suppliers. The
authors visited each company’s purchasing department and asked the department manager to select
a representative sample of suppliq which included both partners (i.e. keiretsdchaebol suppliers)
and non-partner(i.e. independent) suppliers. We intmiewed a total of 31 purchasing executives at
the eight automakers’ purchasing departments to obtain f~back on the appropriateness,
completeness, and clarity of the questio~, and to gain a better understanding of the issues arising
in automaker-supplier relations.
We also interviewed sales and engineering vice-presidents at 70 suppliers (30 U.S., 20
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Japanese, 20 Korean), dtig which the survey w~-pretested. The sumey was translated (and back
translated) into Japanese and Korean by a team of Korean and Japanese Ph.D. and MBA students
at a major U.S. business school, some of whom had worked in the automotive industry. The
language of the survey was refined during interviews at both the automakers and suppliers. Most
importantly, the interviews helped us to gain a better understanding of the industry and the nature
of the supplier-automaker relationship. To minimize key-informant bias and follow the general
recommen&tion to use the most knowledgeable informant (Kumar et al, 1993), we asked the
purchasing managers at each automaker to identi~ the supplier executive who was most responsible
for managing the day-to-day relationship. This person was typically the supplier’s sales vice-
presiden~ sales account manager, or in some cases, the president. The final survey was then sent to
the key supplier infoxmant identified by the automaker.
One may question whether a single informant has sufficient knowledge and ability to assess
the level of trust at multiple levels beween M/lwr supplier organization and the automaker.
AIthough responses from multiple informants would have been preferred (with a cost of a smaller
sampIe), we believe that our informants were well positioned to make this assessment for the
following reasons. Fti key informants had been employed at their respective organizations for an
average of 16 years aad thus had a long histo~ of working with the automaker. These individuals
had p- mponsibilityfor maq@ the day-today relationship with the customer and were weil
aware of the variety of interactions between their, and their customer’s, employees. Further, in
approximately 15 of our in-person interviews with suppli~ the key informants brought 2-3 other
top supplier executives to the inttiew (e.g., vice president of engineer@, key sales
representatives) who had previously filled out our questionnaire separately iiom the key informant.
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During the interview, the group of supplier executives would look at each other’s ~wem ~d come
to a consensus on the “group” answer (we were able to see their individual responses). The degree
of similarity in their responses was remarkable; rarely did the responses vary more than one point
on a seven point Likert scale. In the few cases where there was some discussion, the key informant
typically brought more information to the discussion than the other members. Consequently, we
believe the key informant responses to reliably represent the responses we would have received had
we surveyed multiple individuals at the supplier.
Usable responses were obtained born 135 U.S. (66’?40response rate), 101 Japanese (68%
response rate) and 217 Korean (55°/0response rate) suppliers. The data collection was done between
1992 and 1994. The U.S. and Japanese data were collected in 1992, reflecting data for 1991, and
the Korean data were collected in 1994, reflecting data for 1993. We do not believe this will bias
the results since our analysis fmuses on rather stable measures (i.e. length of relationship, stock
ownership, trust), which Korean suppliers indicated had not changed in any significant ways since
1992.
Operational Measures
Large-sample empirical studies on trust and transactioncosts have rarely been attempted due
to the difficulties associated with operationdizing these constructs. We briefly describe our
measures of trust and tmnsaaion costs below. AU other opemtiorud measures are summarized in
Table 1.
Tm.m Consistentwith previous studi~ we operationalizedtrust using multiple scale iterns designed
to measure the extent to which the supplier trusted the automaker not to behave opportunistically
(Anderson & Nsuq 1990; Heide & Jok 1988; Z*= & ve~~ 1995). Trust W=
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—operationalized *tie sum of the following variables.
1. The extent to which the supplier trusts the automaker to treat the suppiier fairly (I-7 scale).
2. The extent to which the automaker has a reputation for trustworthiness (following through on
promises and commitments) in the general supplier community ( 1-7 scale).
3. If given the chance, the extent to which the supplier perceives that the automaker will take unfair
advantage of the supplier ( 1-7 scale reverse scored).
Our trust construct includes key elements of our definition of trust, including fair dealing, a
reputation and track record of following through on promises and commitments, and a willingness
to forego opportunism even when the chance is available.
Transaction Costs: Transaction costs in the exchange relationship were measured as the sum of the
following three submeasures:
1. The percent of face-to-face communication time, between the automaker and the supplier, that
is spent negotiating a pricedcontract (ex ante contracting) @rcent out of 100 percent].
2. The percent of face-to-fiace communication time, between the automaker and the supplier, that
is spent assigning blame for problems (ex post haggling) @ercent out of 100 percent].
3. The extent to which the supplier f=ls that the automaker uses the information provided by the
supplier to check-upon (monitoring) the supplier ( 1-7 scale).
Since the three scaies are different-the first two are represented as percentages and the last as a
Likert scale-we standudizedthe variables before summing them. Our construct includes three key
elements of tmmactt “onco~ including ex ante contracting, monitoring, and ex post haggling. Thus,
it captures those activities which by themselves are not value-enhancing, but rather are associated
with completing the transadon and ensuring that each party lives up to its part of the agreement.
Although these measures do not capture all of the ~ “on-related costs incurred by the
companies (i.e. search costs are ignored), we believe this measure to be a reasonable proxy of the
18
key elements of transaction costs. (See Table 1 fm a summary of the operational measures and
Chronbach alphasq; all 1-7 Likert scale items were scaled as foiiows: 1not at all, 4=to some extent;
7=to a very great extent.)
MODEL AND DATA A.NALYSIS
The model that was estimated is shown in Figure 1. We estimated this model for the pooled
sample M well as by country. We used LISREL because TRUST is both a dependent and an
independent variable. The antecedents and outcomes of trust can be estimated simultaneously with
LISREL because it is an estimation procedure that jointly estimates a system of simultaneous
equations. Other methodologies, such as regression would have required a number of separate
regression equations.
We acknowledge that the direction of causality between trust and the “determinant” variables
LENG~ CONTINUITY, and FACETIME is open to debate. For example, one can argue that high
trust leads to long te~ continuous relationships and face-to-face contact rather than vice versa. We
have offered theoretical arguments which explain why these particular variables may lead to high
trust. Nevertheless, we expect a high degree of reciprocal causality with these variables-in eff’~
4 Although the Chronbach alphas are high for “Assistance” (.84) and “Specialized Assets”(.78), the
relatively low alpha fm “TIus&”(.48) and “TransactionCosts” (.06) deseme some explanation. The items
that make up the transaction costs measure are different dimensions of mnsaction costs rather than multiple
measures of the same construct For example, in the U.S. lower ex ante bargaining costs were associated
with lowerex post haggling costq but in Korea higher ex ante bargainingcosts were associatedwith lower
ex post hagglingcosts. In some cases spending more time in ex ante bargaining reduced ex post haggling.
Thus, the items that make up the transaction costs measure are different and somewhat orthogonal
dimensions of the measure. This is true, though to a much ksserexten~ of our trust measure. For example,
some suppliers reported that the automaker had treated them fairly (item 1) but they still felt the automaker
would take advantage of them if the automaker had the chance (item 3). Th~ aithough the multiple
measures of trust are positively correlax they measure somewhat diffbrent dimensions of trust and thus
are not perfectiy correlated.
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.a virtuous circle where these variables both influence, and are influenced by, trust. We also
acknowledge that the direction of causality between trust and information sharing and relation-
specific assets is open to debate. For example, one can argue that information sharing and relation-
specific investments lead to high trust (although it is unclear why suppliers would share confidential
information or make initial relation-specific investments without some degree of trust present).
Agti we expect some degree of reciprocal causality with these variables. We address the issue of
reciprocal causality in greater detail in the discussion section. Some readers may prefer to consider
our variables as “correlates of tmst” that have a mutually causal relationship with trust.5
RESULTS
The simple descriptive statistics shown in Table 2 indicate that supplier trust is significantly
higher in Japan than in Korea or the United States, which have similar levels of supplier trust.
Automaker assistance to suppliers is highest in Japan and Kore% with U.S. automakers offering
significantly less assistance to suppliers. The length of the supplier-automakerrelationship is highest
in Japan (41.4 years), followed by the U.S. (32.6 years) and Korea (12.4 years). This result is
expected given the long history of the automobile industry in the two fomner countries compared to
that of Ko% where the industry is less than 30 years old. There is much greater continuity in the
supplier-automaker relationship in Japan than in the U.S. or Korea. Japanese suppliers re-win the
“contract” 91 percent of the time at a model ctige whereas U.S. and Korean suppiiers re-win the
contract 71 and 77 percent of the time respectively. Our data also indicate that there is more face-t~
SIn facq we ran alternative LISREL models with causality sunning both ways. However, the results were
inferior to the model presented in this paper.
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face communication between suppliers ~d automakers in 3apan than in the U.S. or Korea. We
conjecture that f~e-to-facecontict among Japanese automotive transactors maybe facilitated by the
physical proximity of suppliers and automakers in Japan.b Finally, Japanese automakers are far more
likely to hold minority stock ownership positions in suppliers than Korean and U.S. automakers.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
The correlation matrix for all of the variables in this study is presented in Table 3. The
simple bivariate correlation presented in the correlation matrix represents all the direct relationships
between each pair of variables. Therefore, the structural equations model, which separates direct and
indirect effkcts, could yield somewhat different results. The overall fit of the model can be measured
by several different indicators, including the chi-squared statistic, the root mean squared residual
(RMR), the goodness-of-fit index (GFI), and the adjusted goodness+f-fit index (AGFI). In our
modei we have a chi-squared statistic of 166.6 (p+ OOO);RMR of 0.09; GFI of 0.93; and AGFI of
0.82. Therefore, the overall fit of the model is quite good with a GFI of 0.93 being very good.
flnsett Table 3 About Here]
The results of the LISREL model employed to test our hypotheses are shown in Figure 2.
In summary, km Figure 2 we may conclude the following:
(1) Automaker assistance to the supplier had a significant positive relationship with supplier trust
in the pooled sample. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is supported.
(2) Length of the supplier-automak-lationstip~ a significant positive effkct on supplier trust
in the pooled sample.’ Therefore, Hypothesis 2 receives support.
6 In our sample, the average distance -een supplier plants and automaker plants was 82 miles in
Jam 129miks in Ko~ and 477 miles in the United States.
‘ Though as we shall show in Table 4, this relationship held true only within Japan.
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(3) Continuity in the supplier-automaker relationship (i.e., history of re-winning the contract) had
a significant positive effect on supplier trust. ThN, Hypothesis 3 is supported. The LISREL
coefficients are highest for the CONTINUITY and ASSISTANCE constructs which suggests that
they are most significant and robust determinants of trust.
(4) Face-to-face communication did not have an effect on trust in the pooled sample or within any
of the individual countries. Therefore, we did not find support for Hypothesis 4, which proposed
a positive relationship between face-to-face contact and trusts
(5) Stock ownership did not have a significant relationship with trust in the pooled sample or within
any of the individual countries. Thus, we did not fmd support for Hypothesis 5, which predicted that
stock ownership would be positively associated with supplier trust.
(6) Our &ta indicate that in the pooled sample and in each country, high supplier tmst was
associated with low transaction costs. These data were robust across all countries. Thus, Hypothesis
6 is strongly supported.
(7) Our findings indicate a s@nificant positive relationship be~een supplier tmst and the sharing
of conildential work-related tiormation. Thus, Hypothesis 7 is supported.
(8) Finally, our data do not support Hypothesis 8, which proposed that greater supplier trust would
lead to more investments in relation-specific assets. Our data indicate essentially no relationship
benveen trust and investments in relation-specific assets.
~nsert Figure 2 about here]
Individual Country Results
One reason fordoingthis research with samples tim different countries was to examine how
the detenninan tsand outcomes of trust may diffbr across countries (see Table 4). Previous research
suggests that trust between trading partners will vary not only with the attributes of the transactio~
but may also vary due to differences in societal culture, networ@ and business norms in the
‘ We acknowledge a weakness in our fkce-t-f=e mntact measure, which did not take into account
personnel turnover. Two sets of exchange partners could engage in the same munberof days of f=e-to-thee
contacti but the quality of those days of contact could be difikrent if one set of trading partners experienced
personnelturnover while the other did not. We wouldexpect social interactions and face-to-f= contact to
be more effective at establishing tmst when turnover is low.
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institutional environment in which the transaction is embedded (Granovetter, 1985; Hill, 1995).
Consequently, a brief disctqsion of the country-specific differences in our results is warranted.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
In Jap~ supplier trust was universally high in Japan and there was very low variance on
both the trust measures and manYof the “antecedent” variables (See Table 1). These findings offer
empirical support for Dore’s (1983) observation that “moralized trading relationships of mutual
goodwill” generally pervade Japanese transaction relationships. Of the variables in our model, the
most important determinant of supplier trust in Japan was assistance from the automaker to supplier.
Length of relationship follomd assistance as the second most important antecedent variable in the
Japanese sample. Interestingly, continuity of relationship was a less important explanatory variable
in Japan than in Korea or the U.S. It is worth noting, however, that the “re-win” percentage was
universally high in Japan with extremely low variance. Thus, our findings do not necessarily mean
that continuity was not important in developing ~ but rather that it was not as usefid in
discriminating between higher and lower levels of suppliertmst in Japan. Finally, stock ownership
did not have an effect on trust in the Japanese sample. One interpretationof this finding is that stock
ownership has continued for such a Iong time in Japan that it has lost its significance as a governance
mechanism and thus does not affkct “trust” anymore. bother interpretations that stock ownership
is simply not amimportant detcrminan t of supplier trust in Japanese supplier-automaker relations.
Lincoln et al (1992:4) have argued that in JapQ tirms “purchase shares in suppliers to increase their
controi overpricing and production” and that they dispatch personnel to monitor their investment.
Although these practices may result in cooperative interfirrnbehavior, they do not necessarily result
in high trust as we have defined it in this study.
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Like Japan, the most important determinant of trust in Korea was assistance from the
automaker to the supplier. Continuity of relationship followed assistance as the second most
significant explanatory variable in the Korean sample. Re-win rates, and trust, were genemHy lower
in Korea than Japan, with greater variance on both variables. Length of relationship and face-to-face
contact were found to be unimportant as predictors of trust in Korea. Interesting y, stock ownership
had a slightly negative (though not significant) relationship in the Korean sample. Consistent with
Lincoln et al (1992), some Korean suppliers indicated that they thought the automaker used their
stock ownership position to exert control over the supplier. If true, this may explain why stock
ownership was not positively correlated with trust in Korea.
In the United States, continuity of relationship and transaction costs were the only variables
significantly correlated with trust. The relationship between automaker assistance and trust was
positive, but not significant. One plausible explanation for this finding (offered by suppliers we
interviewed) is that U.S. automakers have only recendy been offering assistance to suppliers. As
U.S. automakers provide increased assistance to suppliers, supplier trust may increase. Interestingly,
the relationship beween face-to-face contact and trust was slightly negative in the U.S. sample.
Some U.S. suppliers claimed that they spent a considerable amount of their face-to-face interaction
time with U.S. automakers on unproductive activities, such as negotiating contracts and assigning
blame for problems. Thw quantity of face-to-f=econtactrnay be less importantto developing trust
than quality of cornmunication(Roberts& OReilly, 1974; Sake, 1992). U.S. suppliers also offered
a possible explanation for the lack of a relationship between length of relationship and trust.
Suppliers claimed that length of relationship did not necessarily have a bearing on trust Ind+
some suppliers suggested that the longer they had worked with a particular automaker, the more time
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they had to learn that the automaker was not to beausted. Increases in time and experience with a
particular partner may only mean that one can better trust one’s own judgments about an uncertain
situation. Finally, stock ownership was not a significant explanatory variable because U.S.
automakers did not own supplier stock.
DISCUSSION
The Determinants of Trust
The resultsoffer a number of important insights regarding the development of supplier trust.
Fir% they suggest that providing assistance to suppliers is perhaps one of the best ways to create
high levels of supplier trust. Goukiner’s ( 1963) obsemation that one-sided generosity may act as a
starting mechanism for non-exploitive exchange relations is empirically supported. Automotive
suppliers appear to interpret assistance-giving behavior as an act of goodwill or benevolence as well
as a signal of commitment to Mum exchange. This translates into a high degree of supplier trust.
In additiom supplier trust increases when the buyer has a track record of maintaining a repeate~
continuous exchange relationship with the supplier. One interpretationof these findings is that trust
is built on a past history of behaviors or routines. Thus, revealed committed behavior is more
important than social .mtemction (mere length of rdationship or f--to-f=e contact) or stock
Owll~hip (financial hostages).
Seco@ our findings suggest that although the institutional environment appeared to
influence the development of speeific practices used to create supplier ~ we found evidence of
ts of trust across countries. For example, “continuity of relationship”similarities in the determinant
and “assistance giving” appeared to be quite robust as determinants of trust across countries,
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especially when the experience of Japanese automa.ks working with U.S. suppliers is included (See
Appendix A for the ti~ md analysis on a small sample of U.S. suppliers selling to both Japanese
and U.S. automakers). In our survey of U.S. suppliers selling the same component to both U.S. and
Japanese automakers within the United States (reported in Appendix A), we found that Japanese
automakers were more eflective than U.S. automakers at building trusting relations with L/S.
suppfiers.9 Japanese automakers developed a high degree of U.S. supplier trust through the same
mechanisms identified in the pooled sample, notably by offering assistance and continuity to
suppliers. In additio% U.S. suppliers repined in our interviews that Japanese automakers were more
trustworthy than U.S. automakers due to their lifetie employment and “promotion from within”
policies, which foster continuity in personnel and policies. Stated one supplier executive:
We cannot trust U.S. automakers as much as Japanese automakers hause whenever they
bring in new managemcn~ we get a whole new set of procurement rules and policies. The
rules of the game are constantly changing. With Japanese companies we don’t seem to have
the same problems because their policies and personnel are consistent and stable (Intemiew,
September 12, 1992).
Another executive notecl “It’s not that I don’t trust the person sitting across from me at the U.S.
automaker. I may trust him completely. But I don’t tmst that he will be sitting there a year fkom
now.” The predictable consequence of frequent changes in purchasing management and policies is
that suppliers realk irnplici~ and explicit promises made by the automaker maybe broken when
new management arriv~l” The ability of Japanese automakers to build high levels of trust with
9 These ftigs are consistent with those of a market research fi~ Planning Perspectives Inc., which
conducted a surveyof 700 U.S.suppliersfwChrysierd Ford in 1992. This largesample surveyfoundthat
U.S. suppli- had signifiatiy higher trust in Toyo~ Nissam and Honda than they did in the U.S.
automakers.
10 To tew ~= ~~m we em~~ employ- tenure in the Japanese ~d U.S. autom~em in o~
sample. We surveyed 100 U.S. purchasing and engineering employees (at 2 U.S. automakers) and 100
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suppliers in the United States suggests that the institutional environment may be less important than
firm-level practices in influencing trust.
In summary, an examination of the specific practices employed by the most trustworthy (i.e.
Japanese) automakers suggests that they are effective at building supplier trust because they have
created interorganizational routines that seine as credible signals of long term commitment to
suppliers. In particular, their assistance-givingroutines and their supplier-selectionroutines provide
credible assurances to suppliers that the buyer is committed to the exchange relationship. These
findings suggest that supplier trust is based on OW.WWorrhybehavior that is institutionuiized and
embedded within the buyingjhns’ culture and routines. Moreover, our interview data suggest that
suppliers are much more likely to believe that the automaker’s interorganizational routines are
credible signals of commitment when they have cotildence in the stability of intraorganizational
routines-notably the stability of automaker persomei and policies.
The Economic Value of Trust
Ourstudy is one of the first hrge-sampleempiricai tests of its kind to demonstrate an inverse
relationship be~een trust and transaction costs in supplier-buyer relations. Further, given that the
relationship held true in each country, our findings appear to be robust To @er explore the
relationship between trust and transadon costs-as well as the extent to which trust may create
Japanese employeea(at 2 hpanese automake=)to determine their average tenure of employment Japanese
automaker employees had been with their employer for an average of 16.2 y- while U.S. automaker
employees had only been at their company for 8.8 years. Helper and Sako (1995) found similar results
among 472 executives of Japanese suppliers and 671 executives at U.S. suppliem. Japanese supplier
executives had beenwiththeircompanies an average of 22 y- while U.S. executives had only been with
their companies for 11 years. These data suggest signifkantiygreater employment stability at the Japanese
firms.
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substantive economic value in exchange relationships--we examined the relationship between
supplier trust and the procurement (transaction) costs incurred by each automaker through the use
of a more objective cost measure. Each automaker’s procurement (transaction) costs was
operationalized as the total number of individuals employed in procurement for production parts
(including management purchasing agentshyers, lawyers, and support stafl) divided by the total
value of goods they procured. For ease in understanding, this figure is expressed as the dollar value
of goods (parts) purchased per procurement employee. We believe this is a reasonably accurate
measure of the relative procurement (transaction) costs incurred by each automaker because the
procurement staff is: a) completely responsible for searching for new suppliers, b) completely
responsible for contracting with suppliers, c) primarily responsible. for monitoring supplier
performance, and d) primarily responsible for etiorcing performance. Thus, our measure should be
a reasonable proxy for the relative transaction costs incurred by automakers.l 1 When we plot each
automaker’s procurement costs (or rather procurement productivity), along with each automaker’s
mean score for supplier trust (using our three trust submeasures), the findings suggest a significant
positive relationship between supplier trust and automaker procumbent productivity (See Figure 3;
U.S. automakers are identified as Al, A2, A3; Japanese automakers as J1, J2; and Korean
automakers as K 1, K2, Q. The comelationtin supplier trust (mean score for all suppliers for
each automaker) and automaker procurement productivity for this small sample was 0.66. The
findings indicatcthat 15rmAl, which had low suppliertrw% incurred procurernent(~tion) costs
which were more than twice those of the other U.S. firms, A2 and A3, and almost six times higher
11. we feud ~~ ~is m~~ w= hi@ly co~lated wi~ o~ pmvioUsm~~ of ~ ‘oncosts as
demonstrated by a pearson’s correlation of 0.61.
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than firm J 1. There are undoubtedly a number of factors that are likely to influence procurement
costs (or alternatively, procurement productivity), but supplier trust seems to be an important factor
which has an impact on procurement costs. Trust, as a governance mechanism, cannot be ignored
in discussions regarding the factors that influence transaction costs and economic performance.
Moreover, these findings suggest that the economic value created through trusting interkn
relationships may be considerable.
~nsert Figure 3 about here]
In accordance with our predictions, we also found that trust was positively associated with
information sharing. This finding was echoed in interviews with supplier executives, who ckimed
that they were much more likely to bring new product designs and proprietary technologies to
“trustworthy” automakers. Stated one supplier executive,
We are much more likely to bring a new product design to [Automaker A3] than to
[Automaker Al]. The reason is simple. [Automaker Al ] has been known to take our
proprietary blueprints and send them to our competitors to see if they can make the part at
lower cost. They claim they are simply trying to maintain competitive bidding. But because
we can’t trust them to treat us fairly, we don’t take our new designs to them. We take them
to [Automaker A3] where we have a more secure long term future.
Thus, trust faciiitatesthe sharing of relevant task-rehted information%particularly information that
may be viewed as proprietary by the supplier. This is particularly important because the supplier’s
new designs and innovations may be critical in helping the buyer to differentiate its product in the
marketplace.
Contrary to our predictions,we did not find a positive relationshipbetweentrust and relation-
specific assets. One interpretationof these findings is, of course, that high trust relationships alone
do not provide a sufficient reason for transactors to make greater relation-specific investments in
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trading partners. Trust may not be a strong enough safeguard to protect suppliers’ relation-specific
investments which are subject to opportunistic exploitation. It is also possible, however, that
suppiiers make investments in relation-specific investments due to technological necessity,
regardless of whether or not they have developed a high level of trust in the buyer. But they may
do so reluctantly or they may rely on governance mechanisms other than trust to protect those
investments. For example, suppliers may rely on legal contracts or stock omership as substitutes
for trust. Thus, technological necessity may force suppliers to make relation-specific investments
in automakers they do not trust. Under these conditions, suppliers are forced to rely on other
substitute governance mechanisms to protect their investments.
The Distinctiveness of Tmst as a Governance Mechanism
In the process of speci~ing our model to examine the antecedents and outcomes of trust we
discovered an interesting, and perhaps important phenomenon that explains why trust may be
particularly valuable as a governance mechanism. This finding emerged as we attempted to
determine which variables were antecedents of tru% and which were outcomes of trust. As our
reviewers pointed OULmany of the variables we chose as antecedents of trust could also be
considered to be outcomes of trust (and vice versa). For example, does information sharing lead to
~ or does trust lead to information sharing? Of course, the answer is both-trust and i&ormation
sharing are subject to mutual causality and each variable is therefore both an antecedent and an
outcome of the other. Furthermore, investments in information sharing and assistance giving not
only build u but also simuhaneouslycreate economic value in their own righL Thus, trust leads
to certain value-creating behaviors (i.e. information sharing) and these value creating behaviors lead ~
in turn to higher levels of trust.
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his phenomenon makes trust Unique as a governance mechanism because the investments
that trading partners make to build trust often simultaneously create economic value (beyond
minimizing transaction costs) in the exchange relationship. Trust is thus distinct from other
governance mechanisms identified in the transaction cost literature (i.e. contracts, financial hostages)
for which the investment in the governance mechanism is viewed as a necessary cost to be incurred
by the transactors to prevent opportunistic behavior (Williamson, 1985). According to transaction
cost theory, the rdative attractiveness of each governance mechanismkafeguard is based on its
differential ability to lower transaction costs. IndeecLthe theory’s focus is almost completely on cost
~g rather than value creation. By comparison trust is a unique governance mechanism
because it not only minimizes transaction costs, but also has a mutually causal relationship with
other behaviors that create value in the exchange relationship. This uniqueness may explain why
trust has been described as a key factor and the primary governance mechanism in most studies of
high-pdorrning dyaddnetxvorks (Jarillo, 1990; Lorenz 1988; Powell, 1990; Sake, 1992;
Nishiguch.i, 1994; Dyer, 1996b).
CONCLUSION
Inthis paper we exaxninedthe antecedents and economic outcomes of trust in 453 automotive
supplier-buyerrelationshipsti the U.S., JapQ and Korea Our findings indicate that supplier trust
is highly cormiatcd with stable and consistent buyer routines that represent credible commitments
toward long term k_o~notiiy=i*ce-@tigmti- and suppiier-selectionroutinesthat
promote reiationstipcontiti~. Furth-ow,ti study empiridy validates previous theoretical
arguments and anecdotai dam which has suggested that trust creates value in economic exchange
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relationships. In particular, our findings indicate tit trust reduces transaction costs and increases
information sbirtg in supplier-buyer relationships. Moreover, the economic value created for
transactors, in terms of lower transaction costs, appears to be substantial in the automotive industry.
We should note, however, that while trust may be unique in its ability to create value in exchange
relationships, buyers (i.e. automakers) incur real costs in developing high-trust supplier relations.
These costs come in two forms. First buyers must expend resources to provide assistance to
suppliers. In 1992, Nissan and Toyota supported large teams of more than 75 internal consultants
to provide assistance to suppliers. Although the Japanese automakers get a “return” on their
investment in the form of more efficient suppliers, they still must incur the expense of maintaining
a staff of qualified individuals to assist suppliers. Furthermore, there is an opportunity cost
associated with maintaining long-term, continuous relationships with suppliers. The cost of
maintaining continui~ in supplierrelationships includes the opportunity cost of not taking advantage
of one’s suppliers and the loss of the opportunity to use lower cost suppliers if they come along. The
fact that building supplier trust creates value but also imposes costs suggests that buyers should
carefidly consider both the costs and benefits of trust-building behavior.
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TABLE 1
Summary of OperationalMeasures
Yaridbi
TRUST
ASSISTANCE
LENGTH
CONTINUITY
FACETIME
STOCK
INFOSHARE
TRANSACTION
COSTS
SPECIFIC
ASSETS
Df=iPhn
1. The extent to which the supplier trusts the automaker to treat the supplier fairly ( I -7 Likert scale).
2. The extent to which the automaker has a reputation for trustworthiness (following through on promises and
commitments) in the general supplier community ( I -7 Likert scale).
3. If given Xe chance, the extent to which the supplier perceives that the automaker will take unfair advantage of the
supplier (reverse scored on l-7 Likert scale). Chronbach alpha=.48.
1. The extent to which the automaker provides assistance to help the supplier improve product quality ( I -7 scale).
2. The extent to which the automaker provides assistance to help the supplier reduce manufacturing costs ( I -7 scale).
3. The extent to which the automaker provides assistance to improve inventory managemenddelivery ( I-7 scale).
Chronbach alpha=.84.
Number of years since the supplier first began selling products to the automaker.
The percentage of time the supplier’s business has been renewed when there is a model change.
The annual “person-days” that the supplier-automaker spent in face-to-face contact during the past yczir.
Percent of supplier stock owned by the automaker.
1. The extent to which the supplier shares confidentialiproprictary information (i.e. technical information) with
automaker buyers and engineers (I-7 scale).
1. The percent of face-to-face communication time, between the automaker and the suppiier, that is SpCIItnegotiating a
price/contract (ex ante contracting)[percent out of 100 percent].
2. The percent of face-to-face communication time, between the automaker and the supplier, Ihtit is spent assigning
blame for problems (ex post haggling) [percent out of 100 percent].
3. The extent to which the supplier feels that the automaker uses the informatiol~ provided by the supplier to check-up 011
(monitor) the supplier (l-7 scale). Chronbach alpha=.06.
1. Physical ussel specl@ciry:the percent of the supplier’s total capital equipment investments which would have
to be scrapped if they were prohibited from conducting any future business wilh the auwmakcr (as estimated by supplier
respondents.
2, lledica(edA$sel Speclflcily. “1’besuppliw’s SdW 10the automaker divi~cd by ~lICsllppli~r’sIOIalsaks to all customers.
Chronbach alpha=.78.
TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics: Pooled Sample and By Country
Variables Pooled Japan Korea Sig. Diff.
(n=453) (n=l!5~ (n=lOl) (n=217)
1. TRUST 14.11 13.63 16.37 13.35 ***
2. LENGTH 21.61 32.56 41.4 12.44 ***
3. FACETIME 2042.56 1245.01 4989.54 1413.41 ***
4. CONTINUITY 0,78 0,71 0.91 0.77 ***
5. ASSISTANCE 9.83 7.39 10.15 10.51 ***
6. STOCK 0.04 0.00 0.11 0.03 ***
7. TIUNSCOST 0.01 0.09 -0.40 0.16 ***
8. INFOSHARE 4.82 4,18 5.46 4.93 ***
9, SPEC.ASSET 0.83 0.66 0.74 o.gg ***
Note:
1.TIL4NSCOST is a standardizedmeasure.
2. The lastcolumn indicateswhether the country meansare significantly different from eachother (F-test).
3. Q** ~untw ~rnpleswe si~ificantly different at a = 0.01.
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TABLE 4
LISREL RESULTS BY COUNTRY
Standard Error Significance
***
Relationship ExDected Sien Parameter
.04 5.86
.08 -.30
.10 2.62
.06 -1.57
Ml: LENGTH +Trust
United States:
Japan:
Korea
.24
-.02
.25
-.10
+
***
.04 I .29
.08 -1.21
.10 .79
.06 -.36
.05
-.09
.08
-.02
ti2:FACETIME +Truaf
United States:
Japan:
Korea
t
.04
II
7.90 l**
.08 6.97 ***
.10 .50
.06 3.38 ***
.32
.53
.05
.2 I
H3:CONTINUITY +Truat
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Figure 1: Model of the Determinants and Economic Outcomes of
Trust in Supplier-Buyer Relationships
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APPENDIXA-
To test whether or not tmsting supplier relations could be purposefully created across nationa]
boundaries, we surveyed a small sample of U.S. suppliers who worked with both U.S. automakers and
Japanese automaker “transplants” in the United States. By surveying U.S. suppliers selling the same
component to both U.S. and Japanese automakers within the United States, we were able to control (to some
extent) for cultural and component (technical) differences that might influence trust. The sample consisted
of only U.S. suppliers with at least three years experience and five percent of their total sales to Japanese
automakers. This was done to exclude U.S. suppliers without significant experience working with Japanese
automakers. These 20 suppliers were randomly selected from the U.S. supplier sample.
The table below provides a summary of the sample means for a number of the antecedent trust
variables used in this study. The results indicate that Japanese automakersare more effective than L?S.
automakers at building trusting relations with U.S. suppliers.
SURVEY OFU.SSUPPLKRS SELLING TO BOTH U.JXANDJAPANESEAUTOMAKERS
us. SUPPLIEti us. SUPPLIE~
U.S.A UTOIUAKER JAPANESEA UTO(WAKER
N=20 N=20
TRUST 4.1 5. 7**
THEEXTENTTO WHICH THESUPPUER TRUSTS
THEAUTOMAKER TO TREATSUPPLIERFAIRLY~
IFGIVENTHECHANCl%AUTOMXKER MIGHT TRY 4.0 1.7**
ro r.KE UNFAIRADvmAGE OFSUPPLIER?
LENGTH 22 Yt%Ms 6 YEARS
LENGTH OF RELA1’IONSHIP
CO/VITiVUITT .77 1.00*
PERCENT OF TIIUETHESUPPLIERRE-WINSTHE
BUSINESSATAMODEL CHANGE
FACEZl!ME 1654 1475
ANNUAL MXJVDAYSOF FACE-T6FACECONZACT
ASSJST~CE 1.7 4.1**
l?xTENTOFCWREDUC770NASSLSTXNCEt
E~oFwWTT &mtovEbfENT 2.s 4.5**
Assfsr’cq
i3YTENToFDEmMhWENT0RY 1.s 2.9*+
hL4NAGEMENTASSI=4NCw
~ /4NSWERSAREONA 1-7LIKERTSGUK:@WOrATALL; 4=TOSOIUEE.XTENT;7=ToAVERYGUTE.X:. .r.
l IN EACHOF FIVE CASESWHERE THE MODELCHANGED,SUPPLIERSRE-WON THEBUSiNESSFOR THE NEXT
MODEL
l l r~ oF GROupD[F~~c~ AREONE.rAILEDr.r~ AssUMrnGWEQUAL VARL4NCES; P~.01 LEVEL \
Appendix A (cont.)
An examinationof these results in light of our hypotheses provides futiher suppoti for our findings
regtiing the determinants of supp[ier trust. l%e key factor which enabled Japanese automakers to develop
trusting relationships with U.S. suppliers was offering assistance. U.S. suppliers indicated that, compared
to U.S. automakers,they received more assistance from Japanese automakers ‘inreducing costs, increasing
quality, and improving delivery. Some U.S. suppliers indicated that they received more help from the
Japanese automaker than they fek they deserved given their shoti term relationship. They were surprised
at the willingness of the Japanese automaker to send consultants, free of charge, to help them improve.
Moreover, our interviews with U.S. suppliers revealed that they believed that they would re-win their
business with Japanese customers at the model change because:(I) Japanese automakers had told them that
they would re-win the business if they performed well, and (2) Japanese automakers had a reputation for not
switching suppliers at the model change (in five cases where suppliers were faced with a model change,
suppliers reported re-winning the business in each case). Thus, suppliers had the expectation of a high
degree of continuity in the relationship.’
Finally, U.S. supplier relationships with Japanese automakers were only of short duration, 6 years
versus 22 years with U.S. automakers. A long term relationship was not an important determinant of high
trust in the United States. With regard to face-to-face contact the sample engaged in 1475 man days of face-
t-face contact with Japanese automakers versus 1657 man days with U.S. automakers. On an absolute basis
there are no significant differences. Stock ownership was not a factor in these relationships since Japanese
automakers did not own stock in any suppliers in the sample.
‘ These findings are consistent with those of a market research firm, Plaxining Perspectives Inc., who
conducted a survey of 700 U.S. suppliers for Chrysler and Ford in 1992. This large sample stmey found that
U.S. suppliers had significantly higher trust in Toyo@ Niq and Honda than they did in the U.S.
automakers.
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